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We link the intensity of campaign competition in different electoral systems with the number of candidates running
for public office and their ideological differentiation. We show that proportional elections have more candidates,
competing less aggressively in campaign spending, than those in majoritarian elections. Candidates’ ideological
positions, however, can in general be more differentiated in majoritarian or proportional elections. We also study
the equilibrium effects of plurality premiums and the consequences of heterogeneity among candidates in
nonideological characteristics.
I
n all elections for major public office positions,1
candidates invest a considerable amount of time,
effort, and financial resources in persuasive cam-
paigning.2 Classic examples include broadcasting TV
ads that highlight desirable characteristics of the can-
didate, publishing and disseminating information
aimed at reducing uncertainty about the candidate’s
platform, or communicating readiness to voters by
hiring expert staff and formulating appropriate re-
sponses to current events.
In spite of its relevance in modern elections,
campaign competition has not been systematically
integrated in a theory of elections, together with the
number and ideological position of the candidates
running for office. This omission could be of no major
consequence if the nature of campaign competition
were unrelated to other characteristics of the alternatives
available to voters. However, this is not the case. The
number of candidates running for office, their ideolog-
ical differentiation, and the intensity of campaign com-
petition are all strategically intertwined.
On the one hand, the farther apart the policy
alternatives represented by candidates running for
office, the larger is the incentive for a new candidate
to run representing an intermediate ideological
alternative. On the other hand, the less diverse the
ideological positions represented by candidates run-
ning for office, the larger is the number of voters
that will be swayed by persuasive campaigning.
These features, moreover, are all jointly determined
in response to the rules shaping the nature of com-
petition among candidates, and in particular by the
electoral system. By affecting how votes cast in elec-
tions translate to representation in government—and
ultimately how voters’ preferences are mapped into
policy outcomes—electoral systems shape the char-
acteristics of the alternatives available to voters
through the responses they induce in voters and
politicians.
In this article, we tackle the effect of alternative
electoral systems on the number of candidates running
for office, the ideological diversity of their platforms,
and the intensity of campaign competition. We focus
on a comparison between a pure majoritarian electoral
system—in which the winner of a plurality of votes has
full control of policy and government—and a pure
proportional electoral system, in which the influence
of each party is captured by its share of votes in the
election. While this stylized representation of alter-
native electoral systems admittedly simplifies the
richness of the diverse array of electoral institutions
in use throughout the world, it allows us to
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capture the essence of two major classes of
electoral systems.3
Our model integrates three different approaches
in formal models of elections, allowing free entry of
candidates, differentiation in a private value dimen-
sion, or ideology, and in a common value dimension,
through persuasive campaigning. Each potential can-
didate is endowed with an ideological position that
she can credibly represent if she chooses to run and
gets elected. With the field of competitors given, candi-
dates running for office then invest resources in per-
suasive campaigning, developing (the perception of) an
attribute that is valued by all voters alike. We assume
that in deciding whether to run for office or not, each
potential candidate cares about the spoils she can ap-
propriate from being in office and that voters are fully
rational and vote strategically.
The incentives of voters and politicians are shaped
by the electoral system under consideration. In ma-
joritarian electoral systems, the candidate who wins a
plurality of votes appropriates all rents from office and
implements the policy she represents. In proportional
electoral systems, all parties obtaining a positive share
of the votes participate in government. To reflect this
in a simple setting, we assume that in proportional
electoral systems the policy outcome is the result of a
probabilistic compromise between the elected candi-
dates, where the likelihood that the policy represented
by a candidate emerges as the policy outcome is in-
creasing in the candidate’s vote share.4 The expected
share of rents captured by each candidate is also
assumed to be proportional to her vote share in the
election.
The main result of the article is that proportional
elections have more candidates, competing less aggres-
sively in campaign spending, than those in majoritar-
ian elections. In fact, we show that all candidates in
proportional elections (PE) spend less resources cam-
paigning than any majoritarian election (ME) candidate
and that under mild conditions, the ranking is strict.
Furthermore, in all equilibria in which candidates are
ideologically differentiated, the number of candidates
running for office is larger in proportional elections
(strictly larger under mild conditions) than in major-
itarian elections, where exactly two candidates run. We
also show that the ideological differentiation between
candidates running for office can in general be larger or
smaller in proportional than in majoritarian elections.
The results are driven by how platform diversity
affects the incentives for entry and the intensity of
campaign competition in different electoral systems.
In PE, the number of candidates running for office
and the degree of ideological differentiation among
candidates are determined in equilibrium by two
opposing forces. First, candidates must be sufficiently
differentiated in the ideological spectrum. This is due
to the basic tension between campaign competition
and policy differentiation: the closer candidates are in
terms of their ideological position, the larger is the
number of voters that can be attracted with a given
increase in campaigning by one of the candidates.
Second, the maximum degree of ideological differ-
entiation among candidates is bounded by entry:
candidates cannot be too differentiated in PE without
triggering the entry of an additional candidate, who
would be able to attain the support of a sufficiently
large niche of voters. In contrast to PE, in equilibrium
the winner-takes-all feature of majoritarian elections
breaks these two links and decouples ideological dif-
ferentiation, number of candidates, and the intensity
of campaign competition.
In the fourth section, we introduce a modified
version of PE elections, in which the candidate with
a plurality of votes obtains a premium in both the
likelihood with which her policy is implemented and
in the proportion of office rents she attains after the
election (PE-Plus). We show that for a given plurality
premium, but sufficiently large electorates, equilib-
rium behavior in PE-Plus resembles that in ME. This
suggests that it is the discontinuity in payoffs implicit
in both ME and PE-Plus which induces a decoupling
of the intensity of campaign competition from the
number of candidates and their ideological differ-
entiation. For a fixed size of the electorate, how-
ever, the size of this discontinuity is also relevant.
In fact, if the plurality premium is sufficiently small
(approximating PE), PE-Plus elections admit equilib-
ria with more than two candidates not fully investing
in persuasive campaigning, as in the case of pure PE.
We later consider a variant of the main model in
which candidates are perceived by voters as heteroge-
neous in nonideological attributes even in the absence
of any investments in persuasive campaigning. We show
that if these attributes cannot be affected during the
campaign, then for some parameters it is possible to
3As Cox argues, ‘‘much of the variance in two of the major
variables that electoral systems are thought to influence – namely,
the level of disproportionality between each party’s vote and seat
shares, and the frequency with which a single party is able to win
a majority of seats in the national legislature – is explained by this
distinction’’ (1997, 58). See the discussion in Lizzeri and Persico
(2001).
4In this we follow Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Persico
and Sahuguet (2006). In the online appendix, we show that our
main results do not hinge on the assumption of a probabilistic
compromise.
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find equilibria in which the nonideological appeal of
candidates is larger in PE than in ME. However, if
candidates can complement their innate attributes
by campaigning, then the nonideological appeal of can-
didates (inherited and/or acquired) will be higher in
ME than in PE, as in the case of the benchmark model.
In an online appendix we show that our main
results are qualitatively unchanged if we allow candi-
dates to be both policy and office motivated, as long as
the office motivation is sufficiently important. In es-
sence, we can think of the benchmark model as a sim-
plified version of a more general model, where office
motivation dominates but does not preclude, policy
motivation. In the online appendix we also consider
alternative specifications of the policy function map-
ping elected representatives to policy outcomes. We
argue that while the probabilistic compromise that we
adopt in the benchmark model simplifies considerably
the analysis of electoral equilibria in PE—by producing
vote share functions that are uniquely determined and
well-behaved on and off the equilibrium path—it does
not bias the results towards lower levels of campaign
spending. We show, in particular, that if the policy
outcome is selected as the median policy of all elected
representatives in the ideological space, PE also admit
electoral equilibria with more than two candidates
running for office in which no candidate fully invests
in persuasive campaigning.
The rest of the article is organized as follows.
We review the related literature in the next section.
We then introduce the model, present the result and
conclude. All proofs are in the online appendix.
Related Literature
Our article is related to three strands of literature.
A first stand focuses on the effect of different electoral
systems on the number of candidates running for
office. This literature provides several formalizations
of the well-known Duvergerian predictions, namely
that majoritarian elections leads to a two-party system
(Duverger’s law) and that PE tends to favor a larger
number of parties than ME (Duverger’s hypothesis).
A relatively large literature focuses on Duverger’s law,
studying the equilibrium number of candidates in ME
elections.5 Among these, the closest to our work are
Feddersen (1992) and Feddersen, Sened, and Wright
(1990) (FSW). Our model of ME differs from these
articles on two accounts. First, while in our set-up
candidates are endowed with an ideological position
that they can credibly implement if elected, in FSW
candidates can adjust their ideological positions after
entry without costly consequences. Second, while in
FSW candidates can only differ in an ideological dim-
ension, in our model candidates can also differentiate
themselves by investing in persuasive campaigning.
Finally, two articles compare the effect of alternative
electoral systems on the number of candidates com-
peting for office. Osborne and Slivinski (1996) com-
pare plurality and plurality with runoff under sincere
voting, and Morelli (2004) compares majoritarian and
proportional electoral systems under strategic voting.
Differently than in our article, Morelli focuses on how
different electoral systems influence the incentives of
politicians to coordinate their candidacies, addressing
more directly the issue of party formation. See also Cox
(1997) for an empirical discussion of the Duvergerian
predictions.
A second strand analyzes how variations in the elec-
toral system affect policy outcomes. Myerson (1993a)
focuses on how the nature of electoral competition
affects promises of redistribution made by candidates
in the election. Building on this work, Lizzeri and
Persico (2001) consider redistribution and provision
of public goods in proportional and majoritarian
electoral systems. In both articles, the emphasis is not
on differentiation (in ideological or nonideological
dimensions) but rather on the vote-buying strategies
of the candidates. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988),
Baron and Diermeier (2001) and Schofield and Sened
(2006) consider models of elections and legislative
outcomes, where rational voters anticipate the effect
of their vote on the bargaining game between parties
in the elected legislature. In these articles, however,
the number of parties is exogenously given. Finally,
several recent articles consider the effects of alternative
electoral systems and strategic voting when the relevant
policy outcome is not bargaining over a fixed prize, but
instead taxation and redistribution (e.g., Austen-Smith
2000; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2003), or cor-
ruption (e.g., Myerson 1993b; Persson, Tabellini, and
Trebbi 2006).
In particular, Myerson (1993b) considers a model
where potential candidates are known to differ in
their level of corruption (which all voters dislike) but
also in a second policy dimension, over which there is
disagreement among voters. Myerson concludes that a
proportional electoral system is more effective in re-
ducing the probability of selecting a corrupt candidate
5For papers that study entry in ME under the assumption of
sincere voting see, e.g., Palfrey (1984) and Greenberg and Shepsle
(1987). For papers that study entry in ME under strategic voting,
see, e.g., Palfrey (1989), Besley and Coate (1997), and Patty,
Snyder, and Ting (2009).
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than a majoritarian system. It is interesting to note
that—interpreting the persuasive campaigning as in-
vestments that reduce the probability of corruption in
government—our model yields the opposite result.
The reason is that in Myerson (1993b), the level of
corruption is an exogenous characteristic of electoral
candidates. Together with strategic voting, this assump-
tion is enough to guarantee the existence of an equi-
librium in a majoritarian system where exactly two
corrupt candidates tie, even if noncorrupt alternatives
are available to voters. This cannot occur in a propor-
tional system, where voting sincerely for noncorrupt
candidates is a dominant strategy. In our model, can-
didates’ level of corruption in office is endogenous. As
a result, the winner-takes-all nature of ME provides the
strongest incentive to invest in actions that discourage
corruption in office as compared to PE.
Our article is also related to the large literature
that, following Stokes (1963)’s original critique to
the Downsian model, incorporates competition in
valence issues, typically within ME, and with a given
number of candidates (two). For recent articles, see
Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), Carrillo
and Castanheira (2008), Eyster and Kittsteiner (2007),
Herrera, Levine, and Martinelli (2008), and Meirowitz
(2008).6 Of these, the closest to ours is Ashworth and
Bueno de Mesquita (2009). They show that in a prob-
abilistic voting model with two candidates, candidates
have an incentive to ‘‘diverge’’ in the policy space in
order to soften valence competition.7 While this force
is also present in our model for PE, it is not present
in majoritarian elections. This is partly due to the
assumption that the distribution of voters is known.
Indeed, introducing probabilistic voting as in Ashworth
and Bueno de Mesquita (2009) or Eyster and Kittsteiner
(2007) would smooth the response of the probability of
winning the election to changes in campaign spending
and thus soften the incentives in campaign competition,
making the problem de facto closer to PE.
The Model
There are three stages in the game. In the first stage,
a finite set of potential candidates simultaneously
decide whether or not to run for office. In the second
stage, all candidates running for office simultaneously
choose a level of campaign investment. In the third
stage, a finite set of strategic voters vote.
For given T, define the ideology space
X [ {t/2T : t 5 0, 1, . . . , 2T}  [0, 1], where we
think of T as being a large number.8 In any x 2 X
there are at least two potential candidates, each of
whom will perfectly represent ideology x if elected. In
the first stage, all potential candidates simultaneously
decide whether or not to run for office. Potential
candidates only care about the spoils they can
appropriate from being in office and must pay a fixed
cost F to participate in the election.9 We denote the
set of candidates running for office at the end of the
first stage by K 5 {1, . . . , K}. In the second stage, all
candidates running for office simultaneously choose a
level of campaign investment uk 2 [0, 1]. Candidates
can invest uk at a cost C(uk), where C() is an increas-
ing and convex function. We let C 1ð Þ [ c and—to
allow competitive elections in all electoral systems—
we assume that F þ c# 1=2. In the third stage, n fully
strategic voters vote in an election, where n is a (large)
finite number. A voter i with ideal point zi 2 X
ranks candidates according to the utility function
u(; zi), which assigns to candidate k with characteristics
(uk, xk) the payoff u(uk, xk; z
i) [ 2av(uk) 2 (xk 2 z
i)2,
with v increasing and concave. The parameter a cap-
tures voters’ responsiveness to persuasive campaigning.
Voters’ ideal points are uniformly distributed in X.
Finally, for any u 2 [0,1], let C(u) [ v9(u)/C9(u).
The electoral system determines the mapping from
voting profiles to policy outcomes and the allocation of
rents. In majoritarian elections (ME), the candidate
with a plurality of votes appropriates all rents from
office and implements the policy she represents. In pro-
portional elections (PE), each candidate k 2 K obtains
a share of the total seats in the legislature equal to her
share of votes in the election, sk. The policy outcome
is the result of a probabilistic compromise between the
elected candidates, where the likelihood of the policy
represented by a candidate emerging as the policy
outcome is increasing in the candidate’s vote share
or seat share in the assembly (see Grossman and
Helpman 1996 and Persico and Sahuguet 2006
for a similar assumption). The (expected) share
of rents captured by candidate k, denoted mk, is
6See also Groseclose (2001), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Schofield
(2004), and Kartik and McAfee (2007) for models where one can-
didate has an exogenous valence advantage.
7A similar result is found by Eyster and Kittsteiner (2007), where
parties compete in elections for heterogenous constituencies, and
there is uncertainty over the distribution of voters’ ideal policies.
8In all our formal analysis of proportional elections (PE), we
consider the limit of the discrete case as T/ ‘ and treat both
the policy space and the set of potential candidates as an interval
of R. As it will become clear in the analysis, this simplification
does not sacrifice anything of importance.
9In the online appendix, we show that results are robust to
introducing policy motivation to run for office.
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proportional to her vote share in the election, sk.
Let uK [ {uk}k2K, and xK [ {xk}k2K denote the
level of persuasive campaigning and policy positions
of the candidates running for office. Normalizing
total political rents in both systems to one, the ex-
pected payoff of a candidate k running for office in
electoral system j can then be written as
P
j
k K; xK; uKð Þ ¼mjk uK; xKð Þ  C ukð Þ
 F for j 2 ME; PEf g: ð1Þ
For simplicity, and without any real loss of generality,
we assume that mPEk uK; xKð Þ ¼ sk uK; xKð Þ. We also
assume that in ME ties are broken by the toss of a fair
coin, so that letting Hk [ {h 2 K: sk 5 sh},
mMEk uK; xKð Þ ¼
1
Hkj j if sk$ maxj 6¼k sj
 
0 o:w:

A strategy for candidate k is a decision of whether
to run for office or not ek 2 {0, 1} and a campaign
investment uk(K, xK) 2 [0, 1]. A strategy for
voter i is a function si(K, xK, uK) 2 K, where
si(K, xK, uK) 5 k indicates the choice of voting for
candidate k, and s 5 {s1(), . . . , sN()} denotes
a voting strategy profile. An electoral equilibrium is
a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure strate-
gies of the game of electoral competition in which
voters do not use weakly dominated strategies, i.e.,
a strategy profile such that (1) voters cannot obtain
a better policy outcome by voting for a different can-
didate in any voting game (on and off the equilibrium
path), (2) given the location and campaign decisions of
other candidates, and given voters’ voting strategy, can-
didates cannot increase their expected rents by modi-
fying their campaign levels, (3) candidates running for
office obtain non-negative rents, and (4) candidates not
running for office prefer not to enter: they would obtain
negative rents in an equilibrium of the continuation
game. Ruling out weakly dominated strategies restricts
the behavior of nonpivotal voters, requiring that
they do not vote for their least preferred alterna-
tive. An outcome of the game is a set of candidates
running for office K, policy positions xK, and
campaign investments uK. A polity is a quadruple
a;c; F;C 1ð Þð Þ 2 <4þ. We say that the model admits
an electoral equilibrium with outcome (K, xK, uK)
if there exists a set of polities P  <4þ with positive
measure such that whenever p 2 P, there is an
electoral equilibrium with outcome (K, xK, uK).
Before moving on to describe our main result, it
is worth discussing briefly our interpretation of the
relationship between campaign spending and electoral
outcomes. Candidates invest in persuasive cam-
paigning for a good reason: it works (see Coleman
and Manna 2000; Erikson and Palfrey 2000; and
Green and Krasno 1988). In most of this articles we
take this relationship as is, black-boxing the underly-
ing mechanism by which voters’ choices are affected
by campaigning. There are, however, a number of
channels through which campaign activities can affect
voters’ willingness to vote for a candidate.
First, running an effective modern political cam-
paign demands a substantial organization ‘‘on the
ground.’’ Developing these networks and infrastruc-
ture requires devoting significant time, effort, and
resources. Schofield and Sened (2006) explores the
role of political activists in elections. Second, by
selecting high-quality staff, researching appropriate
responses to current events, and shaping drafts of
future policies, candidates are—and are seen by voters
as being—more likely to succeed in office. Third, per-
suasive campaign can be effective in reducing un-
certainty about the policy that the candidate will
implement once in office. This idea was first formal-
ized by Austen-Smith (1987) and received empirical
support in Coleman and Manna, who show that
‘‘Campaign spending increases knowledge of and
affect toward the candidates, improves the public’s
ability to place candidates on ideology and issue scales,
and encourages certainty about those placements’’
(200, 757).
Our model is fully consistent with this mechanism
after a simple reformulation. In this reformulation, we
interpret the common value dimension in the model
as reflecting the electorate’s uncertainty about the true
positions that candidates will champion once in office.
In particular, when the policy payoff function is
quadratic as in our model, we can recover the exact
benchmark model starting from primitives. Suppose
then that U(xk, z
i) 5 2b(xk 2 z
i)2 and that the policy
yk of candidate k is perceived by voters to be dis-
tributed uniformly on [xk 2 e(u), xk1 e(u)], where
e() is a decreasing and convex function of the in-
vestment in persuasive campaign u. Then the expected
utility of a voter with ideal point zi can be written as
E[U(yk, z
i); u] 5 2b(xk 2 z
i)2 1 v(u), where v(u) is
an increasing and concave function of u.
Results
We begin our analysis by considering proportional
electoral systems. Proposition 1 establishes the core
result for proportional elections (PE). First, we pro-
vide sufficient conditions for the existence of an
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electoral equilibrium in PE in which more than two
candidates run for office without fully investing in
persuasive campaigning. Furthermore, we show that
PE do not generically admit electoral equilibria in
which different candidates represent the same policy.
Proposition 1. If K min 2c;aC 1ð Þf g, 1, pro-
portional elections (1) admit electoral equilibria in
which K $ 3 candidates run for office without fully
investing in persuasive campaigning, and (2) do not admit
electoral equilibria in which only two or more centrist
candidates run for office and no other candidates run.
To prove this result we provide conditions for the
existence of electoral equilibria of a simple class,
which we call location symmetric (LS) equilibria. In
equilibria of this class, all candidates running for
office are located at the same distance to their closest
neighbors in the ideological space; i.e., xk112 xk5 D
for all k 5 1, . . . , K 2 1, x1 5 1 2 xK 5 D0, and all
interior candidates k 5 2, . . . , K 2 1 choose the
same level of investment in persuasive campaigning.
The number of candidates running for office and the
degree of ideological differentiation between candi-
dates are determined in equilibrium by two opposing
forces. First, in any electoral equilibrium in PE, can-
didates must be sufficiently differentiated in the ideo-
logical spectrum, because of the basic tension that
emerges between persuasive campaigning and differ-
entiation in policies: the closer candidates are in
terms of their ideological position, the larger is the
effect of persuasive campaigning by any of the can-
didates. This is the first channel linking strategic entry
decisions, ideological differentiation, and persuasive
campaigning in PE. To see how this channel operates
in our LS equilibrium, consider two candidates k and
k9 . k with policy positions xk and xk9 > xk and
choosing persuasive campaign investment levels uk
and uk9, and let ~xk;k9 2 R denote the (unique) value
of x for which u uk; xk; xð Þ ¼ u uk9; xk9; xð Þ, so that
u(uk, xk; z
i) . u(uj, xj; z
i) if and only if zi > ~xk;j,
~xk;k9 ¼ xk þ xk9
2
þ a v ukð Þ  v uk9ð Þ½ 
xj  xk
  : ð2Þ
In a LS equilibrium, k’s only relevant competitors are
neighbors k 2 1 and k 1 1.10 Because of probabilistic
compromise, policy is equal to the platform of
candidate k with probability proportional to k’s share
of votes in the election. As a result, in equilibrium
voters vote for their preferred candidate. (When voter
i votes for candidate k, she affects the probability dis-
tribution over outcomes by increasing the weight of
candidate k’s position. But then voting for a candi-
date other than the most preferred one is always
a strictly dominated strategy.)11 Thus k’s vote share
is sk uk; uk; xð Þ ¼ ~xk;kþ1  ~xk1;k ¼ D, and therefore
from (1) for PE, the payoff for an interior candi-
date k 5 2, . . . , K 2 1 is
Pk uK; xK;Kð Þ ¼
Dþ a v ukð Þ  v ukþ1ð Þ
D
þ v ukð Þ  v uk1ð Þ
D
 
 C ukð Þ  F:
Defining C(u) [ v9(uk)/C9(uk), k’s best response is
then
uk ¼
C1 D2a
 	
if C1 D2a
 	
# 1
1 if C1 D2a
 	
> 1:

ð3Þ
Similarly, for an extreme candidate, say k5 1, its best
response is u1 ¼ C1 D=að Þ as long asC21(D/a)# 1,
and u1 ¼ 1 otherwise.
Noting thatC() is a decreasing function, it follows
that candidates will be more aggressive in campaigning
the closer they are to one another, eventually competing
away their rents. Candidates that are sufficiently dif-
ferentiated in the ideological dimension, instead, are
not close substitutes for voters. In this case, PE leads
to low-powered incentives, nonideological competi-
tion is relaxed, and candidates running for office can
choose lower (less costly) levels of persuasive cam-
paigning while still getting a positive share of office
rents in equilibrium. To sum up, the strategic effect
of ideological differentiation (on the aggressiveness in
campaigning) imposes a lower bound on differenti-
ation in equilibrium.
The second channel linking strategic entry decisions,
ideological differentiation, and persuasive campaigning
in PE derives from the fact that the limit to the degree of
horizontal differentiation among candidates is given by
the threat of entry: candidates cannot be too differen-
tiated in PE without triggering entry of an additional
candidate, who would be able—given sincere voting in
10This is enough to show that payoff functions are twice dif-
ferentiable in the relevant set (nondifferentiabilities can only arise
for campaigning choices that are not optimal) and that whenever
rents cover variable costs, first-order conditions in the investment
subgame completely characterize best-response correspondences.
See Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2012) for more details.
11A detailed proof can be found in the online appendix (Lemma 1).
The fact that strategic voting boils down in PE to sincere voting
greatly simplifies the characterization of electoral equilibria, assuring
uniquely determined, smooth, and well-behaved vote share func-
tions for all candidates on and off the equilibrium path.
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the electorate—to attain the support of a sufficiently
large niche of voters. The same logic implies in fact that
PE do not admit an electoral equilibrium in which two
or more perfectly centrist candidates run for office. If all
candidates running for office were centrist, it would
always be possible for a candidate representing a policy
position close to the median to run for office, capturing
almost half of the votes. Since the centrist candidates
were making nonnegative rents in the proposed equi-
librium, the entrant’s expected payoff from running
must be positive as well, and there is no way to deter his
entry. As a result, the fully centrist equilibrium in ME
cannot be generically supported in PE.
In the proof we show how to obtain an upper
bound on differentiation among equilibrium candi-
dates as a sufficient condition to guarantee that for
any possible nonequilibrium entrant, there exists an
equilibrium of the continuation game in which the
entrant would make negative rents. We then show
that there exists a nontrivial set of parameters for
which all the previous conditions on D are simulta-
neously satisfied. In particular, we show that for a LS
equilibrium with K # 3 candidates not fully investing
in persuasive campaigning to exist, it is sufficient that
(1) the responsiveness of voters to campaigning is not
too high (i.e., a, a Kð Þ[C9 1ð Þ= 2Kð Þ), that (2) the
fixed cost of running for office is always larger than
the cost of campaigning (i.e., F > c), and that (3) the
fixed cost of running for office is not too low (to
deter entry) or too high (for nonnegative rents);
i.e., 1=2K, F, 1=K  c. Note in particular that we
can support equilibria with an increasingly larger
number of candidates given sufficiently lower costs of
running for office and of campaigning and a suffi-
ciently smaller responsiveness of voters to persuasive
campaign—equivalently, a sufficiently larger ideologi-
cal focus of voters (Stokes 1963).
In contrast to PE, in equilibrium the winner-takes-all
feature of majoritarian elections breaks the links be-
tween platform diversity, entry, and the intensity of
campaign competition. First, we show that Duverger’s
law holds in almost all electoral equilibria. Although
many candidates can run for office, majoritarian elec-
tions trim down competition between differentiated
candidates to two candidates, each of whom invest as
much as possible in persuasive campaigning. The degree
of ideological differentiation between candidates, how-
ever, is not pinned down by equilibrium: majoritarian
elections admit both an equilibrium with two centrist
candidates and one in which candidates are maximally
polarized (as well as any symmetric configuration). For
some parameter values, there also exists an equilibrium
in which more than two perfectly centrist (and in all
respects identical) candidates run for office. We sum-
marize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In a majoritarian election an
electoral equilibrium always exists. In any equilibrium
in which candidates represent different ideological posi-
tions: (1) exactly two candidates compete for office, (2)
candidates are symmetrically located around the median
in the policy space, and (3) both candidates fully invest
in persuasive campaigning (i.e., u1 ¼ u2 ¼ 1).
To see the intuition for the result, note first that
given the winner-takes-all nature of majoritarian
elections, all candidates running for office must tie
in equilibrium. From this it follows that (a) voters
must vote sincerely and that (b) candidates must fully
invest in persuasive campaigning. To see that there
cannot be an electoral equilibrium with K . 2 dif-
ferentiated candidates running for office, note that if
this were the case, (a) and (b) imply that by deviating
and voting for any candidate j other than her pre-
ferred candidate, a voter could get candidate jelected
with probability one. Revealed preference from equi-
librium therefore implies that this voter must prefer
the lottery among all K* candidates running for office
to having j elected for sure. Furthermore, strict con-
cavity of voters’ preferences imply that any voter must
strictly prefer the ‘‘expected candidate’’ (to the equi-
librium lottery, and therefore) to having candidate j
elected for sure. But this leads to a contradiction, since
when K . 2, a voter that is almost indifferent between
her first and second most preferred candidate always
prefers the ideological position of her second most
preferred candidate to that of the expected candidate.
Since in any equilibrium there cannot be more than
two candidates representing different ideological posi-
tions, they must be symmetrically located with respect
to the median of the ideological space.
Therefore, in equilibrium, we must have exactly
two symmetrically located candidates fully investing
in persuasive campaigning.12 In the proof we show
that such an equilibrium exists, and that there is, in
fact, a multiplicity of two-candidate symmetric equi-
libria, with candidates fully investing in persuasive
campaigning.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that proportional elec-
tions have more candidates, competing less aggressively
in campaign spending, than those in majoritarian elec-
tions. This is our main result.
12Feddersen, Sened, and Wright (1990) use a similar argument in
a pure private values model in which candidates decide both
whether to enter or not and which policy position they will
represent.
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Theorem 1 (1) In any admissible electoral equi-
librium in PE, (a) all candidates running for office
spend (weakly) less in campaigning than any candidate
does in any admissible equilibrium in ME, and (b) the
number of candidates running for office is (weakly)
larger than the number of candidates in any admissible
equilibrium in ME in which candidates are differenti-
ated. Moreover, (2) PE admit electoral equilibria for
which the above comparisons are strict.
It is important to emphasize that the assumption
that total office rents are equal in both systems
(which we have maintained so far for simplicity of
presentation) is irrelevant for Theorem 1. The result
is not due to what we can call an ‘‘accounting’’ effect—
whereby candidates compete less aggressively in PE
because they anticipate a smaller share of the pie—but
instead to incentives and equilibrium behavior. In fact,
we can obtain the same ranking across systems even if
the rents per candidate running in the election are
higher in PE.13
It is also worth noting that Theorem 1 holds un-
changed in a multidimensional policy space. As it is
clear from the proof of Proposition 1, the logic for LS
equilibria in PE elections is fundamentally unchanged
in multiple dimensions. Because of sincere voting, the
vote shares are smooth and monotonic to campaign
effort, as in a single-dimensional policy space. The
most relevant difference between R1and say R2, is
that instead of at most two relevant competitors, each
party now faces at most four relevant competitors,
and therefore there is a higher marginal effect of in-
vesting resources in persuasive campaigning. This com-
plicates the algebra, but only changes the parametric
conditions under which there exist a LS equilibrium
with K parties not attaining the campaign limits. Now
consider ME elections. As in one dimension, on the
equilibrium path candidates must anticipate to tie and
must fully invest in persuasive campaigning, and voters
must vote sincerely. What must be shown is that also in
this case only two candidates run for office in equilib-
rium. But this follows from the above properties and
concavity of the policy payoffs.
We close this section with a remark about welfare:
is either a majoritarian or proportional electoral system
generically better for voters? The answer is no, or more
precisely, not without making further assumptions and
imposing a particular criterion for selecting among
equilibria. As we pointed above, all of our results so far
hold without assuming (strict) concavity of the voters’
policy payoff function (which is implicit in our qua-
dratic representation of policy preferences). Without
assuming concavity, however, not much can be said
about the efficiency of alternative electoral systems
within this framework. If one is willing to maintain
that the assumption of concavity of voters’ payoff
function holds generically, then some limited welfare
results follow.
First, for any given parameter values, the best
equilibrium in ME is better for voters than the best
equilibrium in PE. Within the class of LS equilibria
under PE, the welfare comparison comes as an im-
mediate corollary of our previous results, for we know
that it is not possible to have convergence in PE elec-
tions. Given the same level of investment in persuasive
campaigning, concavity of voters’ preferences implies
that any voter strictly prefers the expected candidate with
ideological position corresponding to the expected
value of the equilibrium lottery to the lottery itself.
The same result holds more generally for any electoral
equilibrium in PE: for any equilibrium in PE, any voter
prefers the expected candidate of the equilibrium lottery
to the lottery itself. If this expected candidate is centrist,
then as before, we are done. If not, then still the con-
cavity of voters’ preferences implies that a centrist
candidate will be preferred by a majority of voters to
the expected candidate.
Second, the ranking of the worst equilibria for
voters does depend on parameter values. The worst
equilibrium in ME given any feasible parameter con-
figuration has two extreme candidates exhausting all
resources available for persuasive campaigning. On the
other hand, the worst equilibrium that can be supported
in PE for some parameter configuration has two extreme
candidates slacking in persuasive campaigning effort.
For other feasible parameter configurations, however,
the worst equilibrium for voters in PE has K $ 3
candidates exhausting all resources available for per-
suasive campaigning. All in all, the results in terms
of welfare comparison are ambiguous.
A Plurality Premium in PE
In our stylized model of proportional elections, each
candidate running for office captures a proportion of
office rents equal to her share of votes in the election.
In various political systems, however, the party with
a plurality of votes obtains an additional reward over
13Let BME and BPE denote the total rents in ME and PE
respectively. Then we can write j’s objective function as
P
j
k K; xK; uKð Þ ¼ mjk uK; xKð Þ  C ukð Þ


Bj  F
Bj: Proposition 2
shows that there exists an equilibrium with two parties and
maximum campaigning in ME as long as F þ c# BME, which we
are assuming throughout. From Proposition 1, as long as
BME # 4F and BME , 2/9aC(1), it is possible for rents per
capita in PE to be larger than in ME and still have an
equilibrium in PE with three parties not attaining campaign
limits.
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and above its share of votes in the election. In several
parliamentary democracies, for instance, the forma-
teur is typically the head of the majority party.
To gain insight about this problem, we consider
an abstract electoral system that incorporates the
key feature of ME into our model of PE elections.
In this modified version of the model—which we
call PE-plus—the candidate with a plurality of votes
obtains a premium g 2 (0, 1) in both the likelihood
with which her policy is implemented and in the
proportion of office rents she attains after the election.
PE-plus can then be thought of as an intermediate
electoral system between PE (g 5 0), and ME (g 51).
Letting as before Hk[ {h 2 K: sk5 sh}, k’s proportion
of office’s rents after the election is given by
mk ¼ sk 1 gð Þ þ
g
Hkj j if sk$ maxj 6¼k sj
 
sk 1 gð Þ o:w:

ð4Þ
The next result characterizes PE-plus elections in
large finite electorates. We show that in large elec-
torates there exists an electoral equilibrium with two
candidates symmetrically located around the median
voter fully investing in persuasive campaigning, pro-
vided that the candidates are not too polarized. We
also show that for any plurality premium g, electoral
equilibria in large elections are either of this kind or
such that a single candidate appropriates the plurality
premium with certainty.
Proposition 3.
(1) There exists n such that for all n$ n, there is an
electoral equilibrium in which two candidates
symmetrically located around the median voter
run for office fully investing in persuasive
campaigning.
(2) Fix any sequence of equilibria ~Gn
n o‘
n0
. There exists
n such that if n$ n, then in ~Gn, either
two symmetrically located candidates run for office
fully investing in persuasive campaigning, or a sin-
gle candidate appropriates the plurality premium
with certainty.
The proof of this proposition can be found in the
online appendix. The main intuition for existence of
equilibria with two candidates fully investing in
persuasive campaigning is that for any plurality
premium g, and sufficiently large electorates, the
strategic problem of individual voters in PE-plus
resembles the analogous problem in ME. As a result,
we can support an equilibrium with two candidates,
1 and 2, by having voters coordinate on voting for
their preferred choice among these candidates, even
after entry of a third candidate l. To see this, consider
without loss of generality a voter iwith preferences
l _i1 _i2 (note that we only need strategic voting
among voters whose preferred candidate in {1, 2, l} is
the entrant, l). Voter i faces the following trade-off. On
the one hand, by switching to vote sincerely
in favor of the entrant, the voter is transferring
1/n probability mass from his second best candidate
(k 5 1) to his most preferred candidate (l). On the
other hand, he is also inducing a jump of g/2 in
the probability that the policy of his least favorite
candidate in {1, 2, l} emerges as the policy outcome,
to be ‘‘financed’’ by a similar decrease in the probability
of his second best candidate’s policy being chosen. For
large n, the second effect dominates, and i has incentives
to vote strategically. The intuition for the second part of
the proposition follows along the same lines and is only
slightly more involved.
The previous result should not be interpreted as
implying a complete discontinuity with the PE envi-
ronment. Note that for fixed n, and given a strategy
profile for all other voters, the incentive to vote
strategically increases monotonically in the plurality
premium g, and in the polarization of candidates 1
and 2: for any strategy profile of the remaining voters,
if i has an incentive to vote strategically given some g,
then i also has an incentive to vote strategically given
g9 . g. Similarly, if i has an incentive to vote stra-
tegically for some given degree of ideological differ-
entiation between candidates 1 and 2, then i also has
an incentive to vote strategically for a larger payoff
differential among equilibrium candidates. In fact, it
is easy to see that if candidates running for office are
not at all differentiated, then there cannot be strategic
voting of this type, as in this case supporting the pre-
ferred candidate comes at not cost. But this implies
that there cannot be electoral equilibria with perfect
convergence in PE-plus. On the other hand, in general
candidates cannot be too polarized either, for other-
wise a deviation by one of the candidates to less effort
in persuasive campaigning, forgoing the plurality pre-
mium, can be profitable for sufficiently small g. All in
all, while equilibrium behavior of voters and candi-
dates in PE-plus can resemble behavior in ME, the set
of equilibria of this class has to be pruned to rule out
complete convergence and under some conditions also
extreme polarization.
A natural question at this point is whether equi-
libria with three or more candidates running for office
without fully investing in persuasive campaigning—
which we have shown can be supported in equilibrium
in PE—can survive in the case of PE-plus. The answer is
yes, provided that the size of the plurality premium is
not too large. To see this, note first that whenever a
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candidate is ahead by at least two votes in PE-plus,
strategic voting must be sincere, since in this case any
individual deviation in the voting strategy cannot affect
the identity of the majority candidate. With this result
in mind, consider a location symmetric equilibrium in
PE (g 5 0) such that three candidates run for office
without fully investing in persuasive campaigning, and
the centrist candidate obtains the sincere vote of slightly
more than a third of the electorate. Consider now the
case of a positive but small premium g. From our
previous remark, sincere voting remains a best response
when other voters vote sincerely. Moreover, with small
enough g, winning a plurality of the vote is not worth
a deviation from the optimal campaign investment in
the pure PE environment. Finally, note that if the entry
of a fourth candidate was not profitable in the case of
g 5 0, this has to be true also in the case of a small
plurality premium. In fact, it is enough for this that
when g 5 0, the equilibrium candidates’ rents in the
continuation game following entry are strictly positive,
but we know that this will be the case generically.
To sum up, we have shown that for a given
plurality premium, but sufficiently large electorates,
equilibrium behavior in PE-Plus resembles that in ME.
This suggests that it is the discontinuity in payoffs
implicit in both ME and PE-Plus which induces
a decoupling of the intensity of campaign competition
from the number of candidates and their ideological
differentiation. For a fixed size of the electorate,
however, the size of this discontinuity is also relevant.
In fact, if the plurality premium is sufficiently small
(approximating PE), PE-Plus admit equilibria with
more than two candidates not fully investing in per-
suasive campaigning, as in the case of pure PE.
Pre-Campaign Heterogeneity:
A Model of Selection
In the benchmark model we assume that candidates
are perceived by voters as homogeneous in non-
ideological attributes before any effort is devoted to
campaigning. In this section we consider a variant of
the main model in which candidates are heterogeneous
in nonideological attributes even in the absence of any
investments in persuasive campaigning. We consider
two possible variations of the sequence of the bench-
mark choice model.
1. In the selection model we assume that candidates
are endowed with both an ideological position and
a level uk of an observable attribute that captures
their exogenous appeal to voters. Candidates cannot,
however, invest resources to make the alternative
they represent more appealing to voters.
2. In the selection1choice model, candidates are het-
erogeneous with respect to their exogenous appeal
to voters as in the selection model but can also
invest in persuasive campaign as in our bench-
mark choice model.
We begin with the analysis of the selection model.
We assume that there is a candidate representing each
point in the attribute-ideology space and that candi-
dates with higher level of u have a higher opportunity
cost of running for office c(u). To make the results
comparable to the benchmark choice model, we re-
present the opportunity cost of types in the selection
model with the same cost function C() of the bench-
mark model, so that c(u) [ C(u). The action space of
candidates is therefore restricted to a decision of
whether or not to run for office.
To see how the alternative electoral systems
operate in the selection model, consider first ME.
As in the choice model, the winner-takes-all nature of
ME implies that potential candidates will run for
office only if they have a strictly positive expected
probability of winning. Furthermore, in any equilib-
rium in which candidates are differentiated, only two
candidates will run for office (the argument used in
the proof of Proposition 2 builds on deviations by
voters for a given set of candidates and can therefore
be applied in this case as well). These properties
imply that voters must vote sincerely between the two
candidates running for office on the equilibrium path
and therefore that these candidates must be symmetri-
cally located around the median voter. As a conse-
quence, any configuration of candidates’ characteristics
that can be supported as an equilibrium of the choice
model in ME can also be supported as an equilibrium
of the selection model.
Contrary to the choice model, however, every
symmetric configuration of candidates (in both location
and level of u) can be supported as an equilibrium of
the selection model. In fact, in this alternative timing
specification—a simultaneous game of entry—strategic
voting is effective in deterring entry of any third can-
didate irrespectively of his characteristics.
Consider now LS equilibria in PE. First, note that
voting is still sincere on and off the equilibrium path
in all equilibria. Second, note that if there is a candi-
date running for office with policy position xk and
uk , 1, who earns strictly positive rents, the same
must be true for an alternative candidate with iden-
tical ideological position xk and u
9
k > uk. Therefore in
any LS equilibrium of the selection model, candidates
either reach the bounds on campaign spending or make
zero rents. This implies that if xk  xk1[D > c þ F
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in a LS equilibrium of the choice model with K $ 3
(i.e., candidates are sufficiently differentiated so that in-
terior candidates would earn positive rents even choos-
ing uk 5 1), then in the selection model it must be that
uk 5 1 for all interior candidates.
14 If, on the other
hand, K $ 3 and D, c þ F in a LS equilibrium of the
choice model (i.e., candidates choosing uk 5 1 would
earn negative rents), then the equilibrium level of u of
both the choice and the selection model would be
interior. Summarizing, if candidates earn no rents at the
equilibrium u* , 1 in the choice model, then u* , 1
will also be the equilibrium of the selection model; if
instead candidates earn positive rents in the choice
model, then the equilibrium of the selection model will
be characterized by a higher level of u.15 We conclude
the following.
Remark 1 The selection model allows ‘‘mediocre’’
candidates to run for office in majoritarian elections
and leads to higher level of u than the choice model in
proportional elections. Hence there exists a selection of
equilibria such that the nonideological appeal of can-
didates (inherited) is larger in proportional than in
majoritarian elections. The conclusions regarding the
number of candidates do not change throughout.
The driving force behind this result is that the
selection model introduces more competition among
candidates in PE: if a mediocre candidate is not
completely dissipating his rents in an equilibrium of
the selection model in PE, a candidate with higher u
would find it profitable to run for office as well. This
is not the case in the choice model, where competition
in persuasive campaign takes place among a given set
of candidates running for office. On the other hand, in
the selection model under ME, strategic voting can
prevent the entry of any third candidate irrespectively
of his characteristics, as in Myerson (1993b).
As we argued in the introduction, however, the
assumption that candidates cannot complement their
initial appeal (if any) with campaign actions seems
unwarranted. Candidates are largely defined for voters
during campaigns. Interestingly, when candidates
can complement their initial perceived differences
through campaign actions, as in the selection1choice
model, the tension between the choice and the
selection models is resolved in favor of the bench-
mark choice model: the nonideological appeal of
candidates (inherited and/or acquired) is larger in
ME than in PE.
Within the selection1choice model, denote by usk
the exogenous component of the overall appealing to
voter of candidate k’s alternative, and by uck the
endogenous component due to persuasive campaign,
where usk þ uck 2 0; 1½ . Note that in equilibrium uck
will be a function of usk. As in the selection model,
candidates with higher us have a higher opportunity
cost of running for office c(us). As in the choice model,
candidates running for office can also add to their
exogenous appeal to voters by investing in persuasive
campaign at a cost c^ ucð Þ. In order to make the results
comparable to the benchmark choice model, we also
assume that c usð Þ þ c^ ucð Þ[C us þ ucð Þ, where C() is
the same cost function of the benchmark model.
Consider first majoritarian elections. It is imme-
diate to verify that strategy profiles such that
usk þ uck, 1 for some k can not be electoral equilibria,
for—as in the benchmark choice model—this would
give k a profitable deviation. We conclude that the
difference between the results of the choice and the
selection models entirely relies on the somewhat
knife-edge assumption that, during the campaign,
candidates cannot render the alternative they repre-
sent more appealing to voters. This result already
rules out any possible reversals in the conclusions of
Theorem 1. But we can also show that in this setting,
PE admit electoral equilibria with an interior equilib-
rium in campaign spending. Thus, Theorem 1 holds
unchanged.16
Remark 2 In the selection1choice model, the
nonideological appeal of candidates (inherited or ac-
quired) is larger in majoritarian than in proportional
elections (strictly larger for a nontrivial set of parameters).
14Either (1) in the equilibrium of the choice model candidates
choose u* 5 1, in which case the same thing must be true in
the selection model or (2) in the choice model candidates
choose u* , 1, so that for any position xk rents must be
positive for uk 2 [u*, 1), and thus uk 5 1 for all interior
candidates in the selection model. If also D , 1/K, extreme
candidates must choose u* 5 1 too, for D , 1/K implies that
extreme candidates obtain higher rents than interior candidates.
15The level of u in the equilibrium of the selection model will still
not be maximal since rents are decreasing in uk for uk 2 [u*, 1)
and negative at uk 5 1, so must be zero at some uk, 1. In
Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2012), we show that PE elections admit
equilibria with K $ 3 and D, c þ F.
16To show this, we exploit the fact that the continuation games of
the selection1choice model are a generalization of the choice
model, allowing heterogeneous initial conditions usk. Consider
a LS profile in the benchmark choice model such that u* , 1 in
which all interior candidates earn zero rents (this can be supported
as an equilibrium, see Iaryczower and Mattozzi 2008, 2012). Fixing
parameters, consider a strategy profile in the selection1choice
model such that usk ¼ 0 and uck ¼ u for all interior candidates k.
It can be shown that for any given u2k, u
s
k þ uck usk
 	
is increasing in
usk (the higher initial ‘‘valence’’ acts as a subsidy in the continuation
game). Together with the fact that c usð Þ þ c^ ucð Þ ¼ C us þ ucð Þ, the
zero profit condition implies that no candidate k9 such that
usk0 þ uck0 ¼ 1 has an incentive to run for office. Entry of candidates
with different ideologies are ruled out by the same arguments as in
the benchmark choice model.
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The conclusions regarding the number of candidates do
not change throughout.
In conclusion, if candidates are perceived by
voters as heterogeneous in nonideological attributes
even in the absence of any investments in persuasive
campaigning, and these attributes cannot be affected
during the campaign, then for some parameters it is
possible to find equilibria in which the nonideolog-
ical appeal of candidates is larger in proportional
than in majoritarian elections. However, if candidates
need to campaign in order to differentiate themselves
in nonideological attributes or if candidates can com-
plement their innate attributes by campaigning, then
the nonideological appeal of candidates (inherited
and/or acquired) will be higher in majoritarian than
in proportional elections.
Conclusion
In spite of its relevance in modern elections, cam-
paigning has not been systematically integrated in
a theory of elections together with the number and
ideological position of candidates running for office.
This omission could be of no major consequence if
the intensity of campaign competition were unrelated
to other characteristics of the menu of alternatives
available to voters. On the contrary, however, the
number of candidates running for office, their ideo-
logical differentiation, and the intensity of campaign
competition are all naturally intertwined and jointly
determined in response to the incentives provided by
the electoral system.
In this article, we tackle jointly the effect of alter-
native electoral systems on the number of candidates
running for office, the ideological diversity of their
platforms, and the intensity of competition in persua-
sive campaigning. Our central result is to establish a
comparison between proportional and majoritarian
electoral systems. First, we show that majoritarian
elections induce candidates to campaign more ag-
gressively than proportional elections. In particular,
we expect candidates in majoritarian elections to
invest more than their counterparts in proportional
election systems to reduce voters’ uncertainty about
the policy they will implement once in office, to hire
higher-quality staff, and generically to invest more in
researching, drafting, and communicating appropriate
policy responses to current events. Second, we show
that in all equilibria in which candidates are ideologi-
cally differentiated, the number of candidates running
for office is larger in proportional than in majoritarian
elections, where exactly two candidates run. Third, we
show that the ideological differentiation between can-
didates running for office can in general be larger or
smaller in proportional than in majoritarian elections:
while electoral equilibrium in proportional elections
bounds the minimum and maximum degree of differ-
entiation between candidates, this is not the case in
majoritarian elections, where both full centrism and
complete polarization are possible.
We show that our main comparison also holds
under alternative specifications of the policy function
mapping elected representatives to policy outcomes
and in electoral systems with multiple electoral dis-
tricts. We also consider a variant of the main model
in which candidates are perceived by voters as het-
erogeneous in nonideological attributes even in the
absence of any investments in persuasive campaigning.
We show that if these attributes cannot be affected
during the campaign, then for some parameters it is
possible to find equilibria in which the nonideological
appeal of candidates is larger in proportional than in
majoritarian elections. However, if candidates can
complement their innate attributes by campaigning,
then the nonideological appeal of candidates (in-
herited and/or acquired) will be higher in majoritarian
than in proportional elections, as in the case of the
benchmark model.
The reality of the political systems that we are
studying is undoubtedly more complex than what
our model suggests. Officials elected in majoritarian
elections must sometimes bargain with members of a
second chamber or face constraints brought by issues
as diverse as federalism, the courts, lobbies, and the
limits to the scope of governmental action. Likewise,
the process of government formation in parliamen-
tary democracies implies that the power of individual
parties to affect government policy depends on a
complex dynamic of a complex game. Our goal here
is not to deny any of these forces and mechanisms
but to simplify this complex reality in order to focus
on the key aspects of the interaction between entry,
ideology, and campaign competition in a productive
environment.17
Many interesting aspects remain to be addressed
and are left for future research. We believe that the
simplicity and flexibility of the framework introduced
in this article will facilitate this progress.
17See Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) and Schofield and Sened
(2006) for a more elaborate focus on the process of policy
formation among elected parties.
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